A study of San Francisco Bay Area nonprofit housing devel opers shows that they have the organizational capability to be an agent of low-income housing policy. They are relatively productive and serve predominantly very-low-income house holds. Their organizations tend to be well established, with significant staff levels, wide geographic service areas, and substantial government support. Both the nonprofit housing developer organizations and their /ow-income housing pro jects depend heavily on government resources. Thus, non profit housing developers offer not an independent alterna tive to government, but rather represent a hardworking, dedicated partner.
Introduction
The federal government drastically reduced funding for low-income housing in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1987, new federal budget authority for low-income housing plummeted by 72 percent. This loss of federal funding was not matched by direct city, state, and philan thropic dollar-for-dollar substitution. Instead, most cities now rely on remaining federal funds, spread thinly, for housing maintenance (Christensen et al. 1988) .
In this policy vacuum, nonprofit housing developers have come to capture the hearts and imaginations of the press, policymakers, and politicians. The press showcase nonprofit developers as exemplars of grit and ingenuity, overcoming barriers to produce low-income housing in the face of austerity. Policymakers, disenchanted with bureaucracy and profit-led private.developers, look to nonprofits as the appropriate agents of new low-income housing proposals. Politicians from both the right and the left point to nonprofit success stories as cases of grass-roots-based entrepreneurs. jack Kemp, the new Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and former designer of supply-side economic policy, exemplifies this synthesis of honest commitment to help and of zeal for the private market. The nonprofits seem to have become both symbol and expected operational bridge between low-income housing assistance and free enterprise.
Beneath this widespread enthusiasm for nonprofit housing develop ers lie important but largely unsubstantiated assumptions. The policy perspective assumes nonprofits have the organizational capability to produce low-income housing. Politicians assume nonprofits act as entrepreneurs and speak for grassroots communities. Both policy makers and politicians assume nonprofits act independently, and tap into the private market to leverage nongovernment resources.
Because nonprofit organizations are widely regarded as the best agent for new housing proposals and are assumed to have the neces sary qualifications, they demand systematic research. Yet most studies of nonprofits have been unsystematic, isolated case studies, often of particular projects. 1 While inspiring and instructive, such success stories give only partial pictures of nonprofit operations.
In contrast, the study described herein provides a more complete picture of San Francisco Bay Area nonprofit housing developers over an eight-year period. The study describes nonprofits' organization and housing production, and thus provides some insights into their organi zational capabilities.
The resulting data confirm nonprofit organizational strengths and challenge assumptions about nonprofit autonomy. Bay Area non profits are experienced, well-staffed organizations which produce a substantial portion of the area's affordable housing for very-low income households. Yet, nonprofit housing developers depend on gov ernment support in a variety of forms, and do not bring private resources. Thus, nonprofit developers do not represent an alternative to government but rather a hardworking partner.
This article reports the results of a detailed survey designed to probe the structure and activities of the nonprofit housing sector in the San Francisco Bay Area. The following section discusses the survey meth odology. Subsequent sections describe findings, beginning with a his torical overview of nonprofit low-income housing production, followed by highlights of nonprofit housing developers' organizational charac teristics, and ending with a description of current and forthcoming nonprofit low-income housing projects. The article concludes with pre liminary lessons learned from Bay Area nonprofit housing developers.
Methodolo gy
The survey was designed to provide data on housing production and the general characteristics of nonprofit housing organizations. 2 The San Francisco Bay Area was selected because it is often portrayed as one of the exemplars of a successful nonprofit housing sector. Obser vers credit the nonprofit housing organizations in the San Francisco Bay Area as being "significant actors in producing housing" (San Fran cisco Examiner 1988), and the "principal providers of housing for low income people" (Mayer 1988: 5) .
The sample draws from the universe of all San Francisco Bay Area nonprofit low-income housing developers, as compiled from multiple sources such as the Northern California Association of Nonprofit Hous ing. 3 Information from a preliminary survey conducted in the spring of 1988 and other sources permitted us to separate nonprofits which were actively engaged in developing low-income housing from those which had operations only peripherally linked to low-income housing.
The kinds of nonprofits excluded from our in-depth survey typically fell into two categories. On one extreme lies the typical very-low income-neighborhood-serving organization, often a Community Devel opment Corporation or church, with little housing experience or resources. Such nonprofits might undertake a single housing project, along with other activities addressing neighborhood needs. On the other extreme lie large regional-and national-serving organizations, with considerable experience and resources. Such organizations are concerned with housing. but mainly as promoter, serving as a financial intermediary, technical assistant, or partial investor. 4
Rather than either of these two extremes, poor-neighborhood serving and large-scale promoter, the survey focused on the center, the local nonprofit, whose main purpose is developing low-income housing. These organizations function at the local (city or county) level and build housing expertise and organizational networks over time in their particular jurisdictions. This group should represent the best source of in-depth working knowledge of locally based nonprofit low income housing.
These local nonprofit housing developers formed the pool for our detailed survey questionnaire on organization and projects. The survey was mailed to all 52 low-income housing developers in the Bay Area. Twenty-six (50 percent) provided sufficiently complete responses for analysis. Careful review of the respondents and non-respondents, based on information from our preliminary survey and interviews with Bay Area nonprofit housing experts, suggests that the 26 respondents are generally representative of local, Bay Area nonprofit housing devel opers in terms of type of organization and volume of production. The survey's purpose was to analyze the organizing principles at the operational and project development levels of the nonprofit developer. Specifically, the survey was designed to elicit two types of information:
• Basic facts about the activities of the organization: the year of inception, source of initial administrative funds, geographic area, and types of housing activities undertaken, as well as the groups served by the organization, the source of revenues, and housing production levels since 1980.
• Detailed information about the projects completed during the last fiscal year (1988) , and projects currently in the predevelopment phase, including type of project, the nonprofit role in project development and ownership, sources of funding for the project, the tenure and affordability structure of the project, and unit and resident mix.
Furthermore, data from the San Francisco Information Clearinghouse report, the City of Oakland Community Development Office, and the preliminary survey permitted us to expand the data set of 26 to a total of 39 nonprofit housing developers for analysis of total production. The relatively strong nonprofit share of production in 1981 attests to the length of the "pipeline" for HUD direct-subsidy programs. Even though HUD funding was drastically reduced in 1981, projects approved with funds committed in 1979 and 1980 were still being processed and were not ready for actual construction to start until 1981 and 1982. In addition, the large share of nonprofit production seems to reflect the depressed market rate production caused by high interest rates. As the multi-family market improved, peaking in 1985, it dwarfed modest nonprofit production.
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Characteristics of Nonprofit Housing Development Organi zations in the Bay Area
Bay Area nonprofit housing developers tend to be well-established, with a wide geographic basis, strong government support, and a focus on housing. Although the nonprofit housing developers selected for the sample listed housing construction and rehabilitation as their main acti vity, housing management was also of importance. Nearly 40 percent of the organizations indicated that their activities extended outside of housing development into housing counselling and economic develop ment. In addition, many organizations reported support activities such as advocacy, tenant assistance, and organizing tenant limited-equity co-operatives.
Nonprofit housing development organizations in the Bay Area gener ally predate the fiscal austerity era. More than 60 percent of the organ izations surveyed were formed prior to 1980, while less than 10 per cent of the organizations were formed during the past three years (Fig  ure 5) . The typical nonprofit housing developer was not only experi enced but supported with a paid staff of eleven.
An examination of start-up administrative funding sources reveals that government funding played a key role in the formation of non profit development organizations. Government funds provided nearly 60 percent of nonprofit housing developers' initial administrative fund ing sources (figure 6). Foundations and religious organizations ac counted for approximately one-third of start-up funding, and private funding accounted for less than ten percent of funds. This pattern has not shifted substantially in recent years. Govern ment sources accounted for one-half of total revenues, with federal sources accounting for about one-fifth of fiscal year 1988 revenues (fig  ure 7 ). Private support remained at levels comparable to those during start-up; approximately one-fifth of revenues were obtained from foun dations or individual/corporate donations. Unpaid volunteer laborover 60 percent of organization workforce --undoubtedly made an im portant charitable contribution, however.
While external sources of operational support remain about the same, dues, fees, and charges have grown to account for over 20 per cent of organization revenues. In addition, investment income pro vides approximately 5 percent of total revenues. Though not self sufficient, the nonprofit housing organizations have at least begun to generate revenue to defer the cost of operations.
Contrary to the expectation that increased self-financing would lead to serving higher-income clients, nonprofit organizations do not appear to have shifted their client base in order to increase revenues. Most local nonprofit housing developers in the sample had a city-or county-scale service area. This finding is hardly a coincidence, since organizations whose main purpose is housing development were selec ted for the sample, as distinguished from organizations whose main purpose is addressing problems of a particular poor neighborhood. On the other hand, finding the majority (about 60 percent) were active county-wide constitutes more than a sampling artifact, because it shows that housing developers may need to operate at a fairly wide geographic scale.
Both the nonprofit organizations and their projects were located in a variety of communities. The central cities of San Francisco and Oak land accounted for nearly half of the nonprofit organizations' locations in our sample. But others were dispersed throughout the Bay Area in both older, slower-growing communities and newer, fast-growing com munities. Similarly, and somewhat surprisingly, in view of land costs, projects were dispersed among central cities and suburbs, and among commun!ties which were relatively poor (e.g., Oakland) and wealthy (e.g., Palo Alto).
Characteristics of Bay Area Nonprofit Housing Projects
Survey respondents provided detailed information on projects com pleted in fiscal year 1988 and on "pipeline" projects (those anticipated in 1989 or later). A total of ten projects were completed in 1988, while approximately 45 projects are currently in the predevelopment phase, with construction anticipated during the next three years, assuming project funding can be arranged.
Completed Projects
Projects completed during fiscal year 1988 consisted of 83 percent rental and 17 percent owner units. Eighty-two percent of all units were scheduled for occupancy by very-low-income households (Figure 8 ). Unit sizes were generally small: 21 percent studio, 44 percent one bedroom, 17 percent two-bedroom, and 11 percent three-bedroom. The projects were designed to serve a variety of tenants; 45 percent of the units were scheduled for occupancy by seniors, and 36 percent of the units were reserved for families (figure 9).
As would be expected, projects required significant non-debt sources of capital. Figure 1 0 highlights the different funding sources of fiscal year 1988 projects. Private debt financing accounted for only one-fifth of pro ject costs; projects were highly leveraged, with little sponsor equity pro vided. Cities provided significant levels of project funding for comple ted projects; almost one-half of projects costs were provided by local sources. While this does not reflect the long-term financial structure of low-income housing, it does reflect an extremely strong commitment by local government to address the housing problems of its citizens. The absence of foundation funds is equally significant. 
SO'Yo
Nonprofit housing developers needed substantial subsidies in order to serve very-low-income households. With 30 percent debt, they were able to serve very-low-income households in 82 percent of the units they assisted. Table 1 outlines a prototype project. In this case, rental income was sufficient to cover the debt service. To achieve this finan cial feasibility, however, the typical developer had to piece together nine funding sources for a project in 1988.
Comparison of Completed and "Pipeline" Projects
The arduous, convoluted, creative, and somewhat opportunistic pro cess of assembling a viable project implies an important caveat to the following comparison between current completed projects and pro jects in the "pipeline." The housing development process is so full of uncertainty that what developers today think --or are planning --a project to be may scarcely resemble the eventual project. The develop ers may have some funding commitments but no site, for example. Or the sudden availability of HUD Section 202 funds may convert a family to an elderly project.
Even with this high degree of uncertainty, the differences between recently completed projects and those in the development process pipeline present a striking contrast. Figures 10 and 11 show the project funding sources, but their level of detail masks the most important conclusions. Actual projects depend heavily (approximately 80 per cent) on government and, other than bank resources, have no private support. In contrast, the pipeline projects, while still dependent on government for half of the project funding, are expecting the private sector to provide for the other half. While expected bank participation remains the same for pipeline as for completed projects, and possible funding from foundations and "other" would contribute negligible pro portions, the nonprofits are expecting to increase their own contribu tion from nothing to about 7 percent of project costs. They are also looking to tax syndication for a major contribution (about 20 percent). Of course, if syndication funding, which constitutes an indirect federal subsidy, is classified as government, the shift in government's funding share is less dramatic; it declines from about 80 percent of completed projects to about 70 percent of pipeline projects.
Within the government funding sources, contributions from Com munity Development Block Grant (locally allocated federal funds) and redevelopment funds are expected to be the same for pipeline projects as for actual projects. On the other hand, if pipeline projects are funded as currently projected, direct local contributions would decline drastically and state contributions would decline more modestly, while federal contributions would increase. Although it is difficult to assess the reliability of the state and federal contributions, a significant de cline in direct local contributions seems plausible. The very substantial direct local contribution for the completed projects seems impressive, but probably unsustainable. A comparison of completed and pipeline project types may be more reliable than a comparison of their sources of funding, because new construction and rehabilitation development processes are so different. Completed projects were divided 60 percent new construction to 40 percent rehabilitation, whereas more than 80 percent of the projects in the pipeline are slated for new construction. If they proceed as planned, pipeline projects would serve a larger proportion of families than com pleted projects.
Conclusions
Preliminary results of this study indicate that nonprofit housing organ izations produced more than 40 percent of the Bay Area's new low income housing between 1980 and 1986, validating the nonprofit hous ing sector's purported productivity. Moreover, recent projects serve very-low-income households to a degree far surpassing expectations of results achievable in an era of fiscal austerity. Standard financial viabil ity seems to demand rent levels only affordable by relatively higher income h o useholds. Yet successful Bay Area nonprofit housing organi zations were able to reach very-low-income households (50 percent of median income) in 82 percent of the units they assisted. The combina tion of relatively high volume and success at targeting the needs of the very-low-income, even in the extremely tight San Francisco Bay Area market, demonstrates that the nonprofit housing sector can be effec-live. Moreover, successful nonprofit housing developers are well estab lished, with professional staff, thus exhibiting both a dedication to serving low-income households and entrepreneurial expertise.
However, this conclusion that nonprofit housing developers have the necessary organizational capabilities carries three caveats. First, although the nonprofit sector has been effective and productive, the actual volume of low-income housing units created between 1980 and 1988 was small in comparison to the need. Second, while the nonprofit sector contributes sponsorship and entrepreneurial energy to low income housing projects, nonprofit housing developers generally can not contribute funding. (In about one-half of the respondents' projects, the nonprofit organization was not the final project owner.) Therefore, nonprofits cannot dramatically expand efforts without significant out side funding. Third, as the funding sources indicate, nonprofit project development generally requires a major government commitment, both financial and administrative, to create low-income projects. His torically, the nonprofit housing sector has relied on government assis tance for both project capital and ongoing administrative costs. In con trast to popular images of independent, voluntary organizations, the nonprofit housing sector is highly dependent on government support.
Government support for Bay Area nonprofit housing organizations is not only pervasive, but deep and diverse. At the state level, legislation permitting tax increment financing has recently been revised, and now requires 20 percent of surplus proceeds to be spent on low-income housing. In addition, a state tax credit has been in place for three years, and legislation is currently pending to extend the tax credit sys tem. Moreover, under state law, cities must offer nonprofit organiza tions the right of first refusal prior to selling surplus land at market rates. In the tight land market of the Bay Area, reduced cost or donated land offers an extremely valuable resource for housing devel opment. Finally, state voters have approved bond issues for the con struction of additional low-income housing.
Some cities in the Bay Area have taken an aggressive, supportive stand for low-income housing. Special housing funds have been capi talized by developer exactions, special taxes, general obligation bonds, or one-time general fund contributions. For example, in San Francisco and Palo Alto, commercial developers must either build housing or contribute to a housing fund. In addition, San Francisco reserves hotel taxes for housing, and Oakland has established a special fund for rehabilitating Single Room Occupancy hotels.
Yet even with this level of support, new low-income housing is diffi cult to arrange. The typical nonprofit-developed new construction pro ject must combine land writedowns with special local resources and incentives and CDBG funds, plus whatever HUD subsidies are avail able, into a unique package.
Findings from the survey and key informants suggest that successful, well-established Bay Area nonprofit housing organizations work care fully with city counterparts and private capital (using Community Rein vestment Act leverage whenever possible), monitoring the changing tax and legislative provisions in order to create new housing opportuni ties. low-income housing specialists must be adept at evaluating pro forma variations in order to adapt prospective projects to the changing terrain of financial sources, both public and private. New funding op portunities mean projects can contain more low-income units or reach poorer families. lost resources mean either projects with fewer low income families, or no projects.
Surviving, successful contributors to low-income housing must be entrepreneurial and they must be collaborators. The concept of public private partnership has been tested by austerity and has continued to be refined throughout the learning experience.
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The authors particularly want to thank Michael Smith-Heimer for valuable insigh ts on analysis and contributions to an early draft of this article. (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) ; ABAG (1983) ; and a preliminary survey conducted in a Spring 1988 course at the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley. 4 BRI DGE (Bay Area Residential Investment and Development Group), both a regional-scale housing promoter and an active developer, was excluGed from the survey because of its outlier characteristics of operational sLale and purposes, and partly because it poses an analytic problem. Since BRIDGE develops some low-income units directly and some indirectly throug� various investments in and assistance to non profits which are the main dE teloper, (Pickman et al. 1986 , Stegman et al. 1987 in the aggregate analysis iucluding BRI DGE would create a difficult problem of double-counting. 5 see note 4 above.
